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Book Review
Rogers, Lesley, Minds o f  Their Own: Thinking and Awareness in 
Animals, 212pp., Allen and Unwin, St.Leonards, New South  
Wales, 1997.
T o say of someone that they have a 'mind of their own' is usually to praise them, to imply that they can- think independently. We take the minds of other humans for 
granted, we assume that they have a mind in the first place, 
which can become one's own: but we rarely make such 
assumptions for nonhuman animals. Nonhumans are all too 
often assumed to be mindless automata. 'Minds of their own' is 
thus a title aiming to challenge persistent cultural beliefs about 
other species.
Lesley Rogers is a biologist, whose research focuses on animal 
behaviour. Her particular challenge is to the assumptions made 
by many of her fellow scientists. Those of us trained in the 
science of animal behaviour have been taught not to 
anthropomorphise - that is, we should never generalise from 
human thoughts and feelings to animal behaviour. The trouble 
with consciousness and the notion of mind is that they can't be 
observed, only inferred; hence, we should not attribute 
consciousness to animals, the argument goes.
This scepticism remains a strongly held conviction among many 
scientists. But, Rogers notes, there are increasing numbers of 
biologists who question it, who do seek to find ways to ask about 
animal minds. Her book explores many of the recent findings, 
moving through issues of self-awareness, deception and 
intentionality, questions of intelligence and memory, and the 
relationship between brain size and consciousness. Throughout, 
she gives the benefit of doubt to the animals studied.
Western culture, Rogers points out, is heavily invested in 
defending a boundary between intelligent humans and 
(nonintelligent) other species. Scientists continue this tradition, 
tending to prefer interpretations of behaviour that deny self 
awareness or consciousness. But the boundaries are arbitrary; we 
include humans in consciousness even if they lose the capacity
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for language, yet when nonhumans learn some features of 
human language we search for ways to dismiss their abilities.
Rogers gives many examples of this boundary maintenance. She 
cites, for example, one scientist who insists that even other apes 
cannot access memories independently of triggers in the 
environment. He is not convinced by the many studies of sign- 
language acquisition in apes, even when Koko the gorilla 
expressed past sadness at the death of her companion kitten.
'In the absence of evidence', suggests Rogers, such 
people 'who categorically state that all animals are 
locked into thinking about and responding only to the 
immediate environment, are expressing their attitudes 
to animals, not scientific evidence' (p. 75).
Those who want to maintain a boundary seek all kinds of fence 
posts. Language is one (though challenged by sign-learning 
chimpanzees); tool use is another (also challenged by a range of 
species which use tools). Yet, in her careful analysis of both 
animal abilities and the evidence of early hominid evolution, 
Rogers can find no fences:
'If there is a discontinuity between Homo sapiens and 
other living species', she concludes, 'it does not lie in 
the exclusive possession of any one of these traits'.
We may be better at some things (tool using for instance) but 
there is no evidence of traits exclusive to humans. There is even:
'a continuity of human speech with the brain structures 
that are used for vocalisations in animals. Both stone 
and wooden tools were being used well before humans 
evolved and planning ahead is essential to the survival 
of many species. No single feature on its own makes us 
special' (pp. 163-4).
Not only do prevailing cultural beliefs about the stupidity of 
nonhumans enter scientific interpretations, but the experiments 
themselves are often designed to support them. Can we really 
conclude animal stupidity when we compare humans to animals 
who have spent all their lives in highly impoverished 
environments? It would hardly be surprising if a laboratory- 
reared chimpanzee failed to solve some of the problems it was set; 
so would a human child reared in such dire surroundings.
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The riposte of some scientists is that, to draw proper conclusions, 
we must have properly controlled conditions. On those grounds, 
they reject the interpretations offered by people who have raised 
chimpanzees to use sign language. This, Rogers points out, is:
'a double bind. On the one hand, the rearing and testing 
conditions must be controlled completely or the 
complex cognitive abilities that animals display will not 
be believed. On the other hand, if the rearing and testing 
conditions are controlled completely, the environment 
becomes so sterile that animals raised in it will be less 
able, or willing, to display complex cognitive abilities, 
language abilities and consciousness' (p. 171).
Controlling conditions also means losing the individual. 
Animals become groups in experimental protocols. By contrast, 
those of us who live in close companionship with specific 
individuals of other species - as Rogers does with her Rhodesian 
ridgebacks - know how variable and different they are. Each has 
her or his own personality. I may be a scientist, but I don't need 
science to tell me whether or not my dogs or horses have 
consciousness or understand what I say. My answer comes from 
my own individual experiences with those animals.
Lesley Rogers clearly shares that belief that she is communicating 
with a conscious and aware being when she interacts with her 
dogs, or with the orangutans she has studied in East Malaysia. But 
she does not generally argue from that personal experience; on 
the contrary, she is very careful to examine the evidence from the 
science itself and to question the conclusions of many scientists. 
We could just as well start from the premise of animal awareness, 
she believes, as starting from the prevailing belief in its lack.
Giving nonhuman animals the benefit of the doubt in such ways 
should extend beyond simply interpreting data. If we start from 
the premise that (at least some) animals can be aware, then we can 
allow that some species might be aware of the suffering of their 
fellows. Koko the gorilla, suggests Rogers, exhibited empathy 
toward another gorilla who was crying, apparently to be let out. 
Yet how often is that possibility of empathy ever taken into 
account by those who work with (use) nonhuman animals? Like 
Rogers, I too have often seen other scientists killing rats in front 
of their cagemates; like her, I have wondered, with pain, what
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those other rats were experiencing. Many animals in laboratories 
or farming environments might suffer because of their awareness 
of the suffering or death of their fellows. As Rogers notes:
'None of the present guidelines for animal welfare take 
this into account' (p. 188).
Lesley Rogers makes a persuasive case. At the very least, she 
urges, nonhuman animals should be given the benefit of the 
doubt, not assumed a priori to have no consciousness or minds. 
Her book is, moreover, written accessibly, avoiding the overly 
complicated language beloved of so many scientists. There is a 
great deal invested in maintaining the boundary between 'us 
humans' and 'them', and much of the science is devoted to fence-
building. But even within that science there is growing interest in 
animal minds, and growing resistance to the idea that animals are 
merely clockwork machines.
If we posit other species as mere machines, what does that say 
about ourselves? What does it say about our relationships to 
those other species? Among other things, it limits our 
understandings. Rogers concludes her book:
'By ignoring the most interesting attributes of the 
behaviour of animals we not only diminish our own 
experiences but also diminish the existence of animals.' 
(p. 195).
Other species are adapted to quite different environments to us, 
requiring different skills to negotiate - not lesser, just different. 




Dennett, Daniel, Kinds o f  m inds, x + 244pp., Phoenix, London, 
1996.
Dennett takes up the question of animal minds. Do animals have 
subjective states or are they merely capable of (sometimes) doing 
clever things. His answer is curiously dogmatic. They have no 
subjective states, hence they have no minds. Yet in the same 
breath -the book can be read in almost one breath- he 
acknowledges our ignorance about animals and their capacities. 
The argument appears to be: if we are unsure of the capacities of 
animals then we should say they have no subjectivity, no minds. 
He claims that language gives humans a unique advantage in the 
development of subjectivity but this is not a good argument 
unless we have established that other animals do not have 
'languages'. We do not know this and Dennett does not even 
refer to the studies with dolphins and bonobos which purport to 
show that they have language. This is a profoundly disappointing 
book because a great deal of it simply restates the dogmatisim of 
past philosophy concerning the uniqueness of humans.
Hoeg, Peter, The Woman and the Ape, 229pp. H arvill Press, 
London, 1996.
Two thirds of this book is a wonderful, witty novel full of attacks 
on meat eating, zoos and animal experimentation but with a very 
soft touch. There is a very clever and constant use of animal 
analogies, e.g. 'There is nothing pleasant about abandoning the 
protection afforded by hopes and daydreams and Madelaine 
shrank from it like a hermit crab forced to leave its whelk shell' 
(p.75). It is only after a while that you realise that when an analogy 
is drawn it nearly always involves an animal.The last third of the 
book is a sexual/social fantasy straining all credibility. An ape 
whisks a woman away to a supposedly idyllic garden. Realizing 
the limitations of such a life they return to society draw out other 
(hidden) apes and sail away
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Carruthers, Peter and and Smith, Peter K, editors, Theories o f  
theories o f  mind, xv + 390pp., Cambridge Univesity Press, 
Cambridge, 1996.
The first three parts of this book take up a wide range of debates in 
the philosophy of mind. Part four consists of four articles on 
whether non-human primates have minds. The authors are 
Andrew Whiten (Psychology, St Andrews), Daniel Povinelli 
(Comparative Behavioural Biology, New Iberia Research Center), 
Juan-Carlos Gomez (Psychology, Madrid) and Peter Smith 
(Psychology, Sheffield). Andrew Whiten concentrates on what it 
means to attribute mental states to beings such as chimpanzees. 
Daniel Povinelli tries to show that there are plausible reasons 
why chimpanzees (at least) might have a theory of mind pointing 
to features such as gaze-following and self-recognition in mirrors 
but then he raises some doubts. Shifting the focus onto practical 
understandings of overt mental states as expressed in intelligent 
social action, Gomez argues that what chimpanzees display is 
more complex than trial-and-error but it need not involve a 
meta-representational theory of mind. While Smith asserts that a 
theory of mind cannot exist without language - in the sense of an 
abstract symbolic system of communication. The conclusion to 
the article and the book is quite a telling example of human 
arrogance: 'Only if chimpanzees could talk to each other about 
mental states would they have evolved mind-reading, and only if 
they could talk to us about mental states would we believe them'. 
Hopefully the club of 'we' is diminishing.
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